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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY MAAS, 
P/,aintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, 
Defendant<% Appellant. 
CASE NO. 
14808 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the Appellant and Petitions the Court for a rehearing 
and reargument of the above entitled cause upon the following 
grounds: 
POINT I 
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN BASING IT'S 
DECISION UPON, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
JN GIVING AND SPB.MITTING TO THE JURY, IN-
STHl TTIOX NO. IZ. AND SPECIAL VERDICT NO. 6, 
FOH. THE REASON THAT: 
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A. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR FACTS AD-
MITTED AT TRIAL SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT OR REQUIRE SUCH INSTRUCTION OR 
VERDICT, AND 
B. UNDER THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE THE AP-
PELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DISPOSE 
OF THE COLLATERAL IN A COMMERCIALLY 
REASON ABLE MANNER, AND 
C. INSTRUCTION NO. 12, IS NOT A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
Dated: April '1978. 
Layne B. Forbes 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Petitioner 
DELIVERY RECEIPT 
Served 2 copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and 
included Brief upon James L. Wilde and Paul S. Felt, Attorneys 
for Respondent, at 400 Deseret Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
____________ day of April, 1978. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN BASING IT'S 
DECISION l'PO~, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN" GIVING AND SUBMITTING TO THE JURY, IN-
STRUCTION NO. 12, AND SPECIAL VERDICT NO. 6, 
FOR THE REASON THAT: 
A. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR FACTS AD-
MITTED AT TRIAL SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT OR REQUIRE SUCH INSTRUCTION OR 
VERDICT, AND 
B. UNDER THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE THE 
APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DIS-
POSE OF THE COLLATERAL IN A COMMER-
CIALLY REASON ABLE MANNER. 
C. INSTRUCTION NO. 12 IS NOT A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
• • • • 
A. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR FACTS AD-
1\UTTED AT TRIAL SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OR 
REQUIRE SUCH IXSTRUCTION OR VERDICT. 
The Court gave and submitted to the jury the following instruc-
tion and Special Verdict: 
Instruction No. 12 
J<~\·cn if you find that defendant, Utah Bank & Trust Com-
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pany, had the right to repossess the 1972 Mack Truck in the 
manner that the repossession was accomplished in this case, you 
are instructed that the Bank had the lawful duty to sell the truck 
in a commercially reasonable sale. To be commercially reason-
able, the sale must meet the following requirements: 
(1) The Bank must have given notice of intention to hold 
the sale, including the date, time and place thereof, to all persons 
having any rights or interest in the truck. 
(2) The Bank must have exercised due diligence in at-
tempting to get the best price obtainable for the truck. The re-
quirement of due diligence is satisfied by acts such as advertising 
the sale to prospective buyers of trucks and soliciting bidders for 
sale. 
Proposition No. 6 
The disposition of the 1972 Mack Tractor on February 27 
or 28 by the Utah Bank & Trust Company was a conunercially 
unreasonable disposition of the tractor. 
The Appellant took exception to Instruction No. 12, and 
Special Verdict No. 6. (R-350, 320) 
There was no evidence whatever to support this Instruction and 
Special Verdict. The undisputed evidence as it relates to this issue 
is as follows: 
1. The title to the truck, and thus the ownership thereof, was 
at all times in the name of Kenneth Allred. (Tr. 132, Ex. 12D) 
2. On February 25, 197.5, the Appellant repossessed the truck. 
(Tr. 95, 96) 
3. At the time of the repossession the balance of the promissory 
note was $4346.38. (Tr. 99, Ex. 6P) 
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4. On February 26, 1975, Arvel Allred, father of Kenneth All-
red, (owner of the truck) came to the bank and paid the balance of 
the note. (Tr. 99) He did this so the bank would not sell the truck; 
he didn't want Kenneth Allred to lose the truck. (Tr. 99) 
5. On March l, 1975, the bank released the keys to the truck 
and the Certificate of Title thereof to the owner, Kenneth Allred. 
(Tr. 119) 
From the foregoing evidence, which is unequivocal and undis-
puted, the only possible conclusion that can result therefrom is that 
the debtor (Kenneth Allred) redeemed the collateral; that the col-
lateral was not sold. The title was not endorsed or negotiated by the 
bank, nor was any Bill of Sale executed, all of which would have 
been necessary in event of a sale. How could the bank sell the truck 
to the owner (Kenneth Allred) who had a right to and did redeem? 
B. UNDER THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE THE AP-
PELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DISPOSE OF THE 
COLLATERAL IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE 
MANNER. 
Before disposition of the collateral the debtor (Kenneth Allred) 
had a right to redeem the collateral. Section 70A-9-506 U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, provides as follows: 
70A-9-506. Debtor's right to redeem collateral.-At any 
time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or en-
tered into a contract for its disposition under section 70A-9-504 
or before the obligation has been discharged under section 
70A-9-505 ( 2) the debtor or any other secured party may unless 
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otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral 
by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collat-
eral as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured 
party in retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for dis-
position, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in 
the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attor-
ney's fees and legal expenses. 
Section 70A-9-504, relating to the secured party's right to dispose 
of the collateral, only has application in the event the debtor did not 
redeem the collateral beforehand. 
C. INSTRUCTION NO. 12 IS NOT A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
The instruction as given, would require: 
( 1) that notice be given to all persons having any rights or in-
interest in the truck, and 
(2) that the bank must have advertised the sale to prospective 
buyers of trucks and solicited bidders for the sale. 
Whereas Sections 70A-9-504 and 507, dealing with secured 
party's right to dispose of the collateral and liability for failure to 
comply with the requirements set forth only require: 
(1) 
(2) 
that "reasonable notification of the time after which any 
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor." (Sec. 504) 
(Emphasis added) 
that "the fact that a better price could have been obtained 
by a sale at a different time or in a different method from 
that selected by the secured party is not itself sufficient to 
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reas-
onable manner." (Sec. 507) 
,,,,,,,,, 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court in its majority opinion based its holding upon the 
finding by the jury that the truck was not disposed in a commercial-
ly reasonable manner. However the evidence is crystal clear that 
the debtor (Kenneth Allred) redeemed the collateral, as he had a 
right to by law, and thus negating the necessity to dispose of the col-
lateral in any other manner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Layne B. Forbes 
Attorney for Appellant 
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